When Contractors Write Strategy: The Hidden Risk Inside Project Meridian

Elon Musk, Palmer Luckey and Newt Gingrich will shape Pentagon priorities. The question is who protects the public interest.

On 30 September, standing before troops at Marine Corps Base Quantico, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced Project Meridian. It is a 120-day study of how war will change and what weapons the United States must build to win the next one. Three people will lead it: Elon Musk, the head of SpaceX; Palmer Luckey, founder of the defence technology firm Anduril; and Newt Gingrich, the former Speaker of the House. Musk sat in the audience as his role was announced.

On the surface, this looks sensible. Wars are changing fast. Cheap drones, artificial intelligence and satellites are reshaping the battlefield. Who better to help the Pentagon think about the future than the people building it?

That question has an obvious answer and an uncomfortable one. The obvious answer is that builders know things that bureaucrats do not. The uncomfortable answer is that builders also have something to sell. When the same people who run companies with Pentagon contracts are asked to decide what the Pentagon should want, the public needs strong protections. So far, none have been described.

What Meridian is meant to do

According to the Pentagon's own announcement, Project Meridian will study how warfare could change in the coming decades and identify the capabilities the United States needs for what a department memo calls absolute technological dominance. The press release says the study will cover environments from underground tunnels to cislunar space, the region between Earth and the Moon. Reports on the launch point to autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, robotics and new kinds of weapons as the main themes.

The group has 120 days. It will then release a public report along with a classified annex. It will work under the Pentagon's Chief Technology Officer, Emil Michael. Mr Hegseth said it is not meant to produce new strategy or policy papers. It is meant to map what the military should be able to do, and what technology it will need.

Mr Hegseth announced it alongside other changes, including a new US drone command and a cut of about 20% in the top ranks of the military.

Why industry advice is not new, and not wrong

Governments have always leaned on outside experts in wartime. The scientists of the Manhattan Project came from universities and industry. The agency that gave the world the early internet, DARPA, works by funding outside researchers. In recent years, the Pentagon has set up advisory boards of technology leaders, including one chaired for several years by Google's former chief executive, Eric Schmidt, which also drew questions about his business interests.

There are good reasons for this. Government is slow at buying software and hardware. Commercial companies move faster and often lead the technology. In a war that is draining stockpiles, with drones costing a few thousand dollars being met by interceptors that cost far more, the Pentagon has a serious need to think differently about cost and scale.

Musk and Luckey are credible voices on these themes. SpaceX already launches national security satellites. Anduril builds drones and autonomous systems. Neither person is a stranger to the subject. It would be wrong to claim that their involvement is automatically a problem.

Where the problem begins

The problem is not that experts are involved. The problem is what happens when the experts also stand to gain. There are three kinds of conflict worth separating.

Financial conflict. Companies tied to Musk and Luckey hold significant contracts with the Pentagon. If Meridian recommends more autonomous systems, more satellites or new launch capacity, those companies may be well placed to benefit.

Information conflict. People who review the military's future needs may see classified plans, budgets and gaps. That knowledge is valuable to a company that sells to the military, and a rival that does not have it would be at a disadvantage.

Agenda conflict. Perhaps the most subtle. The people leading a study decide which questions are asked. If the study is framed around "underground to cislunar space", it matches closely the areas where Musk's companies already work, such as tunnelling and lunar-capable rockets. A different set of leaders might have framed the questions differently, putting more weight on air defence, logistics or diplomacy.

None of these require bad intent. They can arise from honest enthusiasm for what one knows best. That is why rules exist, so that the system does not depend on everyone's good character.

What rules might apply

American law has several tools for this. A federal conflict-of-interest law bars officials from taking part in matters where they have a financial stake. People who advise the government for a limited time can be treated as special government employees, who may serve for up to 130 days in a year and must file financial disclosures. The Pentagon can also use advisory committee rules, which require balance and open meetings in many cases.

The announcement did not say which route Meridian will use. It is not clear whether the co-leaders are employees, advisers or volunteers, which ethics rules apply to them, or whether they must step aside from recommendations that touch their own companies. A 120-day study fits within the 130-day limit, which may be a coincidence, but the public has not been told.

This is the key point. The rules exist, but whether they apply here is unknown. The department can fix that quickly by publishing the arrangements.

When public power is lent to private hands, the terms of the loan should be public too.

The memory of an earlier experiment

The public has seen something like this before. When Musk led the Department of Government Efficiency, his role raised questions about conflicts, because his companies deal with many of the agencies being reviewed. DOGE's claimed savings were disputed, and critics said the process lacked clear oversight. Supporters said it cut waste and broke old habits.

Whatever one thinks of DOGE, the main lesson is not about Musk. It is about process. When a high-profile effort runs on personality and speed, with weak disclosure, people end up arguing about motives instead of results. A study of future war cannot afford that. Its findings will guide spending of enormous size, and they will be only as credible as the process that produced them.

What safeguards would make it credible

A short list of steps would answer most of the concerns. None of them would slow the study much.

1. Publish the legal status of each co-leader and the ethics rules that apply.

2. Require public financial disclosure for the three leaders and any senior members, including holdings in companies that could benefit.

3. Set recusal rules. Anyone with a financial stake in a technology should step aside from recommending it.

4. Include independent members, such as military officers, academics and cost analysts without commercial links.

5. Ask for technology-neutral recommendations. The study should describe the capability the military needs, not the product that supplies it.

6. Allow outside review of the classified annex by a body such as the Pentagon's inspector general or congressional committees.

7. Publish dissenting views. If members disagree, the public report should show it.

These steps cost little. They would let supporters of Meridian say, with a straight face, that the study was clean.

The case for moving fast

There is a strong counter-argument, and it deserves a fair hearing. The United States is at war with Iran, and the war is consuming munitions. Washington has just signed a contract worth $24.4 billion to expand missile production. A third aircraft carrier and thousands of additional troops are heading to the Middle East. In this setting, long reviews can feel like a luxury.

Supporters would also say that the real decisions still sit with the Secretary, Congress and the Pentagon's technology chief, and that Meridian only gives advice. They would add that Gingrich, a politician rather than a contractor, is part of the team, and that Musk and Luckey are only two among several voices.

These points are fair. But they are also reasons to build safeguards, not to skip them. Advice from a high-profile team carries weight, especially when it comes in an announcement that the Secretary himself made. If the study recommends things that happen to match the leaders' products, even if the match is a coincidence, the doubts will remain. Clear rules protect the leaders as much as the public.

The link to the wider AI debate

Meridian arrived in the same week as two other stories about artificial intelligence. On Tuesday, AI executives agreed at the White House to a voluntary pledge to police themselves. On Wednesday, California signed laws to protect workers from AI risks. Musk was at the White House on Tuesday.

Taken together, these events show a pattern. In civilian life, powerful AI is mostly governed by promises. In defence, it will be shaped by processes that are largely classified. In both, ordinary citizens have limited visibility. That is a thin base on which to build technology that could one day make life-and-death decisions.

Why India should watch

India is a large buyer of defence equipment, including from the United States, and it is building its own drone and autonomy industry through start-ups and government innovation programmes. Three issues matter.

First, standards. What the Pentagon asks for often becomes a template for allies. If Meridian leads to new requirements for autonomous systems, Indian forces and suppliers may have to adapt.

Second, dependence. A deeper reliance on foreign systems for AI and space capabilities raises questions about software control, supply and technology transfer.

Third, India's own rules. A recent US State Department report notes that Indian defence procurement rules can limit bids by wholly foreign-owned firms. As defence ties grow, both countries will need clear, fair processes for how industry advice and contracts are handled.

India's own defence planning also draws on private firms and advisers. The lesson from Meridian is that such links work best when the terms are transparent.

A test of seriousness

Project Meridian can be a valuable exercise. The military does need to think about war differently, and some of the best minds on those subjects work in industry. But a serious study needs more than good minds. It needs a clean process.

The questions now are simple. Will the three leaders disclose their interests? Will they step aside when their own products are on the table? Will the report show where it disagrees with itself? If the answer to each is yes, Meridian could become a model for how democracies use private expertise. If the answers are vague, the report will arrive in 120 days, and the first thing people will ask is not what it says, but who wrote it and who gains.